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Philosophical literature has given scant attention to the problem of privacy as
such; the framework of reference within which privacy has so recently and widely
become a matter of controversy is a distinctly contemporary one. What has not been
discussed, or at least made clear, is why privacy is commonly considered a right or a
value to be protected by the law. There is no historical consensus, in philosophy,
politics, or law, that it is such a right. Few philosophers would argue that privacy is
a "natural" right or that the intrinsic nature of privacy establishes it as a legal right.
To be sure, it seems apparent that the circumstances of existence in modern society
are in many ways more restrictive of privacy than conditions in the past; we seem
haunted by specters of the organization man, Big Brother, and the omnipresent state.
Yet the facts of a changing social and political structure do not themselves attest the
badness of that change. Indeed, opinion, judgment, and choice may be exclusively
individual and private-and perhaps it is true that in ordinary discourse we gen-
erally assume them to be so-but this observation does not establish privacy as an
essential, or even desirable, ingredient of opinion and judgment. Any analysis
appropriate to modern political and legal structure must take these facts into account,
but the facts themselves leave unanswered the question of the status of privacy as a
right.
The simple answer to this question is that some degree of privacy is necessary in
order to ensure to the individual the possibility of moral choice and action; but this
is too simple an answer. Given a definition of moral choice as a right of the indi-
vidual, one might then proceed to a description of the elements necessary to fulfill the
requirements of that definition, in which privacy might or might not be essential.
The claim that privacy is a right to be protected by law is, therefore, a question of
value discrimination, and the justification of privacy in this context is a problem of
moral definition and analysis. The definition of moral choice does not lend itself to
factual description, and no amount of word-mongering will make it otherwise. The
initial question in moral theory is itself a value question: what ought the moral status
of the individual to be?
On the matter of what the moral option of the individual should be, the history
of philosophical thought presents such a wide divergence of definitions as in some
instances to yield only flat contradictions. The controversy has been further muddled
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by the almost invariable tendency of proponents of a value judgment to attempt a
justification of their definition by purported factual reference. This persistent effort
of moralists to establish a value judgment on unwarranted factual grounds-such as
by reference to the "natural," the "historical," or the "divine"--has tempted many
contemporary thinkers to dismiss the entire controversy as meaningless and to assert
a limitation of discourse to that which has warranted factual reference.
The reminder is somewhat fatuous, but necessary, that problems are not resolved
by being ignored. The question of how the moral status of the individual is to
be defined remains the most profound consideration of our philosophy, for that
definition will entail the factual description of the political, social, and legal structure
which will meet the requirements of that definition. It is clear that any consideration
of whether privacy is indeed a right of the individual will depend upon what
definition of the individual we accept. While the question of privacy has rarely
been directly discussed in moral thought, it is not surprising that the problem has been
lurking on the fringes of all moral, political, and legal theory, awaiting consideration.
It is a historical commonplace that problems often await acknowledgment until cir-
cumstantial developments force them upon our attention. After centuries of failure
to recognize privacy as a factor pertinent to moral and political speculation, we
suddenly find ourselves concerned with the right of privacy as one of the most
critical problems of contemporary political and legal analysis. The nature of our
social structure as it has developed in the recent past forces us to recognize that the
privacy which until now has apparently been casually presumed as an ingredient of
moral action can no longer be presumed but must be specified.
The history of the recent past has shaped for us, whether we like it or not, a
highly centralized, institutional, and increasingly corporate social and political
structure. Within the complex of corporate pressures that prescribe the possibilities
of action for every man in the modern state, it is a matter of serious concern what
latitude of moral discretion is allowed to him. The question is no longer so much
one of preventing an invasion of "rights" as that of maintaining conditions that will
make the exercise of rights possible. Whether or not it is desirable that the law
exercise its function in thus assuring conditions for the realization of privacy is
dependent on philosophical definition, not on fact.
The first question, therefore, that must be asked about the right of privacy is
whether it is indeed a right at all. Political philosophies present profoundly different
views as to the right, or desirability, of private judgment, conscience, or reservation.
Italian courts, for example, have this year for the first time allowed that "conscien-
tious objection" may be an acceptable justification for "refusing obedience," and
the negative attitude of many political systems to any such claim is well known. The
philosophy that describes the political structure as essentially corporate in nature has
traditionally derived from, or resulted in, a description of the moral status of the
individual that not only denies the right of privacy but designates it a political and
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moral misdemeanor. Hegel's distinction of moralitdt, as referring to individual
private judgment, and sittlichkeit, the definition of obligation in terms of duties
defined by the corporate, institutional order, is, of course, the classic example of
political philosophy which argues that the claim of privacy is simply an exhibition of
caprice, triviality, and irresponsibility. The moral realization of the individual
depends entirely upon the degree to which he can identify his interests and duties
with the value structure appropriate to the particular corporate order in which he
finds himself. Such a view allows little controversy in respect to the right of
privacy, since the rights and duties of individuals are determined by the existing
corporate orders in which he participates, the highest form of which is the state.
Moral discrimination is thus not a function of "private" individual judgment but of
historical relativity. The final reduction of privacy is accomplished by this view with
the claim that, in the last resort, the individual must accept the value interpretation
of an "arbiter" who properly discerns the duties and obligations of the historic
moment.'
The traditional and casual interpretation of British-American philosophy has been
that it is sternly opposed to the corporate view, defining the political structure as
a collectivity the legitimacy of which derives from and depends upon the private, in-
dividual judgments of those who are comprised in that collectivity. Hence, in this
interpretation of our political philosophy, privacy is assumed to be a right justified
by utility if not by nature. The right of privacy therefore seems to be an integral
and essential ingredient of our political philosophy, a right to be protected by law.
Such an analysis is indeed casual, a thoroughly inadequate description of the develop-
ment of the concept of privacy in our thought, but the persistence of the ill-defined
assumption in the face of the facts of contemporary social organization is indicative
of the confusion and ambiguity that characterize the idea of privacy.
Perhaps the last philosopher who gave any significant attention to the privacy of
the individual was Jeremy Bentham; his strongly expressed view that law was an in-
vasion of privacy that must be justified on the ground of necessary utility was some-
what, but not profoundly, modified by John Stuart Mill. Certainly, our ideas of the
function and justification of law have changed rather drastically in the past hundred
years, largely under the impact of changing facts of political order. Yet so little
attention has been given by philosophers to the intimate relation of law to private
judgment and action that one must wonder, on reading much of our moral and
philosophical literature, just what kind of amorphous, politically unattached indi-
vidual these ethicists are talking about. It would not be sensible to argue that Ben-
tham's ideas are immediately applicable to our problems, but it is regrettable that
subsequent thought did not recognize the importance of his effort to distinguish
1 One of the clearest statements of this moral view in recent philosophy is that of F. H. BRADLEY,
ETmcAx Srumruss (1876), especially chapter V, "My Station and Its Duties." Bradley used the ambiguous
term phronemos to describe the moral arbiter.
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carefully and distinctly the area of private, individual action and responsibility from
that of political and legal liability.2 His perception of the problems that would
ensue from a confusion of moral responsibility and legal liability provide numerous
examples that are relevant to our consideration-for example, his suggestion that
any legal effort to enforce "prohibition" would involve such an invasion of privacy
as to occasion, on purely utilitarian grounds, more harm than good in the social
fabric?
Bentham's break with tradition in moral and political analysis was more pro-
found than his vehement rejection of natural law and natural rights. What emerges
in historical retrospect is that Bentham was in fact rejecting a model of analysis that
had been inherited from Greek philosophy. That model has been aptly termed by
Peter Laslett the "face-to-face society."4  It was a model singularly inappropriate
to the facts of the political state as these facts were beginning to become self-evident
in the nineteenth century. Political fact could no longer be brought within the frame-
work of an analysis that assumed a homogeneity-geographic, ethnic, religious, moral
-which greatly simplified the problems of moral and legal relationship. Kant had
finally recognized this but so belatedly that his brief treatment in Religion Within
the Limits of Reason Alone was without appreciable audience. Hegel sought, by a
tour de force, reinforced by dubious historical dialectic, to describe a political orga-
nism of such homogeneity that its corporate structure would resolve moral and
political, individual and social, relations and conflicts. In the assessment of subse-
quent history, however, with its repeated attempts to achieve the model of corporate
order by force, Hegel should not be made the victim of abuse for the excesses we
have witnessed in the name of ethnic purity and national aggrandizement.
It was not only in Hegelian thought that there persisted this model of a homo-
geneous face-to-face social structure in which questions of private judgment and
opposition would not arise. Through the eighteenth and up to the middle of the
nineteenth century, the communitarian ideal was a dominant model in British,
American, and French thought. Persistent in opposition to the rapid-and inevitable
-- development of more centralized and institutionalized social organization, these
communitarians sought in mutuality and homogeneity of purpose to escape the
restrictions that such social structure imposed on the individual. There are two
profoundly ironical features of this eighteenth century ideal which has exerted such
an influence on our thinking. In the first place, the intellectual stubbornness in the
use of a model of analysis that was manifestly inappropriate to the emerging social
'The significance that Bentham attached to this distinction was immeasurably clarified by the publica-
tion of his sequel to AN INTRODUCTION TO TIE PRINCIPLES OF MoRALs AND LEoIsLATiON (1789). Bentham's
moral, political, and legal views can no longer be properly discussed without careful reference to Tim
ImITS OF JtRIsPRUDENCE DEFINED (Everett ed. 1945), so ably edited by C. W. Everett; yet this truly
monumental discovery seems to have been almost wholly ignored.
SBENTuAm, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION ch. x7 (1789);
BENTHAm, THE LIMrrs OF JURISPRUDENCE DEFINED ch. 21 (Everett ed. 1945).
'PmLosoPHy, PoLITIcs AND SocIrY ch. io (Laslett ed. 1956).
PHILOSOPHICAL VIEWS ON THE VALUE OF PRIVACY
structure was matched by the continued and often heroic efforts of men to establish
and maintain a society fashioned on the face-to-face model. That Robert Owen, for
example, whose own successful career as an industrialist should have made him per-
ceptive to the development of an industrialized society, put his hopes and his fortune
into such an experiment as New Harmony is almost incredible. A model suited to
the small, relatively isolated, artisan city-state of Athens was an anachronism in the
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century states of the Western world.
An even stranger charateristic of this philosophy was its rejection of the right of
privacy. At a time in history when, as Bentham recognized, the moral status of the
individual depended upon protection from an increasingly dominant and intrusive
social organization, the communitarians tried to effect a kind of supercorporate
organism without even Hegel's historical substance. The rather dismal failure of
these efforts is itself an epitaph for a philosophy and a model of analysis no longer
appropriate or useful. In some instances, the rejection of privacy took the form of
an aggressive attack, as if private judgment and opinion, rather than the social order,
were the source of conflict and disorder. The remarkably successful experiment of
John Humphrey Noyes, the Oneida community, carried this denial of privacy to the
extreme of forbidding monogamous marriage relations, on the ground that these
fostered selfishness, jealousy, and strife. It is interesting to note that in all these views,
the elimination of privacy as a source of social conflict also eliminated the necessity for
any legal processes to arbitrate such conflicts. The lawyer is the first casualty in
Utopia.
It is tempting to assess this eighteenth- and nineteenth-century climate of opinion
as an exhibition of sheer obtuseness, of patent unrealism in the face of the clearly
developing structure of social and political organization. Yet a more generous
appraisal would recognize that this was a strenuous, if futile, resistance to an institu-
tionalized social order that threatened so to engulf and submerge the individual that
all the values for which man had struggled for two thousand years were endangered.
It is difficult to depart from an established pattern of analysis and the value system
appropriate to it; the inherited face-to-face value model admitted no accommodation
to the new social order but only a total rejection of it. History moved inexorably
in the nineteenth century to an intensified and widespread development of the
centralized, ubiquitous political organization that had been so strenuously rejected.
Thus, toward the end of the nineteenth century, the thought of the immediate past
had provided the ingredients for a fruitful consideration of the problem of privacy in
the modern state. Hegel had, on whatever dubious grounds, described the nature
of the corporate political order that was rapidly becoming a reality; much was to be
gained from his analysis of the institutional structure of that order, even if his value
premises were unacceptable. Bentham, refusing to abandon an individualistic value
system, had demonstrated that the traditional patterns of political analysis were in-
adequate to formulate the status of the individual in the political and legal context
of the modern state. For their part, the communitarians had rather pathetically
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provided ample evidence, in both thought and practice, that values defined by retro-
spective nostalgia were stillborn in the modern world.
At this strategic time, there occurred what can only be accounted an intellectual
tragedy: the effect of the First World War on Western thought. The formulation of
the relation of the individual to the modern state, in the framework of analysis
provided by Bentham and Hegel, was indeed well under way at the end of the
nineteenth century. The British idealists, strongly influenced by Hegelian thought,
were beginning to fashion a new model of political analysis. While they were in a
sense "Hegelian," they were also influenced by the individualist tradition of British
philosophy.' In addition, the principles of Utilitarianism were modified in terms of
contemporary social structure, especially by Henry Sidgwick.' Significant also were
the definitive and illuminating studies of Kant by Edward Caird.7 Thus, at the turn
of the century, there was emerging a model of political analysis and philosophical
definition which saw the necessity and the significance of describing individual
rights in the context of the modern institutional social structure. The hitherto in-
compatible values of utilitarianism and corporatism were beginning to find mutual
accommodation.
Yet today-and this is the tragedy-one would have to search assiduously to find
any mention whatever of this most promising era of our recent philosophical specula-
tion. The work of Sidgwick, Green, and Bosanquet has all but been assigned to
oblivion, and the important steps they made in the analysis of rights, and of privacy
as a moral right, were totally ignored in subsequent thought; at the moment, we
are, philosophically, about where we were in the middle of the nineteenth century.
On the other hand, unquestionably these thinkers had a very real impact on the
practical politics of the twentieth century, ushering in a new concept of the positive
function of the state as responsible for an equality of rights among its citizens!
The depreciation of British idealism has been generally described in terms of
a revolt against the Absolute and rejection of metaphysical abstraction. Such an ex-
planation does not account at all for the neglect of Sidgwick, and it bespeaks a
meager acquaintance with such work as that of Green. It is seldom noted, but
'Especially, BERNARD BoSANQuEr, As pEcrs OF THE SOCIAL PROBLEM (1895), ThE PIIILOSOPIIICAL
ThEoRY OF THE STATE (1899), THE VALUE AND DESTINY OF THE INDIVIDUAL (1913), SOCIAL AND INTER-
NATIONAL IDEALS (1917). The most systematic work was that of THOMAS HILL GREEN, WOR s (R. L.
Nettleship ed. x885).
1 TnE METHoDs OF ETmcs (x874), THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMtY (2d ed. 1887), TiE ELE-
mENTS OF POLITICS (i891), and his numerous other writings.
"THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT (878), THE CRITICaL. PMLOSOPHr OF IMMANUEL KANT (889).
'For example, the most influential economic theory of our day, that of John Maynard Keynes, cannot
properly be described without reference to the "climate" 'of the Cambridge school largely generated by
Sidgwick, a major influence on the economic theory of Alfred Marshall and through him on that of
Keynes.
American pragmatism might also be said to have had more influence in the areas of politics and law
than in the realm of philosophy itself. The pragmatists were generally rather casual about the problem
of privacy, although Dewey, in his earlier writing, while influenced by his study of Hegel, evidenced
serious concern with the ethical problems of an institutionalized social structure. See especially JOHN DEwEY
& JAMEs H. TUFTS, Ermcs (x9o8).
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attention needs to be called to the traumatic effect of the First World War. For us
who have lived in a continuing state of war, hot and cold, the intellectual deteriora-
tion that resulted from the impact of that decline in civilization can be appreciated
only in retrospect. The intellectual scapegoat was Hegelian philosophy, as utilized
by such chauvinists as von Treitschke-whose interpretation of his views Hegel
would surely have disdained. Philosophical enterprise seemed so shocked by
historic reality that resolutely and almost uniformly it turned away from re-
ality; from the major concern with the facts of politics and law characteristic of
Sidgwick, Green, Bosanquet, and their contemporaries, the postwar philosophers
proceeded to the construction of patterns of analysis that were so singular as to be
almost incommunicable and that had little or no relevance to the increasing prob-
lems of law and politics.
The problem of the political and legal status of the individual in the increasingly
corporate structure of all modern states can no longer be ignored. Conditions have
thrust upon political and legal institutions the demand for definitions and policies of
control. The nature of the political and legal decisions required, such as the assessment
of homosexual behavior, of the extent of the right to counsel, or of privacy invasion
by electronic means, is a sharp demonstration that the most pressing demand upon
our philosophy is for a consideration of the moral and political obligations, duties,
and rights within a corporate social order that evidences none of the characteristics of
a relatively simple, decentralized, face-to-face society. Our definitions and models of
analysis must be appropriate to the facts, although this does not mean at all that they
are derivable from those facts. Vague generalities will not suffice, nor will mere
reference to "constitutional guarantees," although this is not meant in any sense as a
depreciation of constitutional function. There must, for example, be some clear
specification as to whether our political philosophy is to enjoin and enforce some
degree of homogeneity and agreement in respect to morals and values0
The analytic requirements imposed by the problems of privacy are therefore two-
fold: the definition of values and the specification of procedures. The first is the
task of moral philosophy, reflected in the political function of legislation. The second
depends upon legal process, especially as it operates to control the various admin-
istrative functions to which the individual is subject. Failure in or neglect of either
of these tasks leaves only the alternative of an increasing latitude of arbitrary admin-
istrative discretion that can actively circumvent any achievement of values by the
individual. Legal control of administrative processes is mandatory, but if it is to be
other than a sheer exhibition of force its procedures must be justified. That justifica-
tion can be provided only by a value judgment as to what the moral and political
rights of the individual ought to be. If privacy is defined as an essential requirement
for the achievement of morality, then privacy is a right that the law must protect and
provide. Modern man is born in chains; only the law can set him free.
, See the strong argument of Sir Patrick Devlin in support of the view that law should enforce an
acceptable moral code. SIR PATRICK DEVUN, THE ENFORCEMENr OF MoRALs (1959).
